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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 Roland Murrell appeals his convictions on nine counts of an indictment charging 
him with numerous offenses.  He raises two issues on appeal.  He argues that certain 
evidence was admitted in violation of the Bruton rule, and that absent that testimony, the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.  He also argues that the district court 
erred in imposing consecutive sentences.  For the reasons provided below, we will 
affirm.1 
I.  
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with this case, we 
need not discuss the procedural or factual history.2  
 Murrell argues that but for the introduction of a statement that violated the rule of 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), no reasonable juror could have been 
convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Bruton prohibits the introduction at 
trial of a prior statement of a non-testifying codefendant.  Here, King testified and was 
subjected to cross examination.  The statement was also redacted, and the court gave an 
appropriate limiting instruction.  We realize that King did not testify until after the 
Government had rested and the court had denied Murrell’s motion under Rule 29.  At that 
                                                            
1 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is highly deferential.  The verdict must be upheld if “after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in 
original)).  Since Murrell did not object to the sentence, we review the imposition of sentences for plain error. 
United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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point, Murrell had not been able to cross examine King and Bruton applied.  However, 
we will not now decide if the district court’s consideration of King’s redacted statement 
in the Government’s case-in-chief violated the rule of Bruton because Murrell did not 
raise that issue prior to the Rule 29 ruling.  He also has not made that argument on 
appeal.  Accordingly, the argument would have to rise to the level of plain error before 
Murrell’s Bruton claim would justify relief.  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 
129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428–29, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009).  That high standard requires that 
Murrell establish there was an error, that was plain, and that affected his substantial 
rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732,  (1993).  The quantum of evidence 
against Murrell here prevents him from satisfying that burden. 
 The Government presented video evidence that showed Murrell inside the House 
of Rajah taking Leayle, Sr.’s jewelry out of his pocket and attempting to sell it.  The 
evidence showed that this occurred within hours of the robbery and the shooting of 
Leayle, Sr.  There was testimony from the clerks at Vishnu Jewelers and manager at 
House of Rajah explaining how Murrell behaved when attempting to sell the gold chain 
and bracelet.  Murrell tried to use a fake name when asked for ID by the clerk.  King sat 
on the side at both stores observing Murrell.  Finally, Murrell was observed in the bank 
cashing the check the manager of the House of Rajah gave to King.     
 Thus, even if we assumed arguendo that a Bruton violation occurred prior to the 
court’s denial of Murrell’s Rule 29 motion, Murrell would still not have established plain 
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error based on any Bruton violation.3  Thereafter, King was called as a witness and 
Murrell had an opportunity to cross examine him.  Thus, any issues that may otherwise 
have arisen under Bruton disappeared before the end of trial.4  
II. 
 Murrell also challenges the district court’s decision to impose consecutive 
sentences.  He was convicted of five substantive crimes under the Virgin Islands Code.5  
He was separately convicted of firearm crimes under the Virgin Islands Code for the use 
of a firearm in “the commission or attempted commission of a crime of violence.” 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a).6  He was sentenced to fifteen years for violation of the substantive 
crimes, and fifteen years for violation of the firearm crimes – both sentences to run 
consecutively.   
 The decision to have the sentences run consecutively, rather than concurrently, 
was clearly within the district court’s discretion.  See 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) (“The foregoing 
applicable penalties provided for the violation of this section shall be in addition to the 
penalty provided for the commission of, or attempt to commit, the felony or crime of 
violence.”) (emphasis added).  In Government of Virgin Islands v. Douglas, we held that 
                                                            
3 As we explained in United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 540 (3d Cir. 2008), relief under the plain error 
doctrine is discretionary and should only be granted when the record establishes that a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result. See also Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b). Clearly, no such miscarriage of justice is established on this record.  
4 We take no position on whether King’s testimony and the concomitant opportunity for Murrell to cross examine 
him negated the existence of a Bruton issue when the court denied Murrell’s Rule 29 motion.  We also take no 
position on whether Bruton required the district court to rule on Murrell’s Rule 29 motion without considering 
King’s redacted statement.  
5 Aiding and Abetting Attempted Murder in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), 331, and 11(a); Aiding and 
Abetting First Degree Assault in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 295(1) and 11(a); Intent to Commit Robbery in violation 
of 14 V.I.C. §§ 295(3) and 11(a); Aiding and Abetting Robbery in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 1861, 1862(1), and 
11(a); Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 551(1) and 552. 
6 Use of a Firearm During the Commission of: (1) an Attempted Murder, (2) a First Degree Assault, and (3) a 
Robbery in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a). 
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the “in addition to” language of an analogous subchapter to § 2253(a) “is consistent with 
both an intent to mandate consecutive sentences and an intent to allow the sentencing 
judge to exercise his or her discretion in selecting between consecutive and concurrent 
sentences.” 812 F.2d 822, 833 (3d Cir. 1987) (interpreting 14 V.I.C. § 2251(a)(2)(B)).  
 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive 
sentences. 
III. 
 For the reasons expressed above, we will affirm the district court. 
 
